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Abstract—Mobility as a Service takes the concept of XaaS to transportation: a MaaS provider shall merge transport options from
different mobility providers, seamlessly handling the whole experience of traveling, from providing information, to travel planning, and
payments handling. To effectively support the creation of a market of MaaS providers, we envision the creation of ICT infrastructures
based on microservices, a modern and renowned development model that fosters the creation of an ecosystem of reusable
components. The flexibility of such platforms is their key advantage, yet it poses many security issues. In this paper, we look at these
problems through the lens of our experience on one of such platforms, called SMAll. We classify the most relevant vulnerabilities
related to data reliability, integrity, and authenticity, and we investigate directions for their mitigation.
Index Terms—MaaS, Microservices, Integrity, Authentication, Provenance, Reputation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of Mobility as a Service (MaaS) was born
in Finland and it is rapidly spreading worldwide [1]. Key-
point of a MaaS provider is that it shall offer a unique and
seamless interface to its users, aggregating heterogeneous
transport options offered by different mobility providers
(e.g., different agencies providing transportation by taxi,
bus, train, plane, car-sharing, etc.), handling the whole ex-
perience of traveling, from providing information, to travel
planning, and payments. To effectively support the creation
of a market of MaaS providers, we envision the creation
of ICT infrastructures based on microservices. This modern
and renowned development model [2] fosters the creation
of an ecosystem of reusable components. In the context of
MaaS, microservices shall efficiently and flexibly combine
heterogeneous data sources, such as available transport op-
tions, real-time data regarding vehicles and infrastructures,
pricing, etc., to provide customized travel planning, infor-
mation and ticketing to final users, as well as monitoring
and strategic planning tools to policy-makers.
We are currently developing one of such infrastructures
as a marketplace for mobility services, called Smart Mobility
for All (SMAll). In our vision, SMAll is the enabling tech-
nology to solve the challenges of the MaaS market, from
developing user-contributed, crowd-sourced applications,
to launching a MaaS operator, to planning effective and
sustainable transport policies for smart cities.
However, we recognize that such a promising platform
as SMAll has a lot of security issues derived from its
openness regarding the usage, deployment, and (above all)
reliability of its services.
2 THE SMALL ARCHITECTURE
The SMAll architecture revolves around the concept of
service. SMAll is not simply a collection of services and



























Fig. 1. Service categories in SMAll
it is rather an enabler for their deployment. Indeed, we
already classified some macro-categories of services that
we can expect to find in SMAll. Figure 1 outlines some of
the most important ones, arranged in layers of increasing
complexity — in this context, “complex” means the creation
of functionalities on top of other “simple” services. Starting
from the bottom, we find services that are either wrappers
for legacy software, e.g., travel planners that do not include
real-time functionalities, or services that provide basic data.
The aim of this class of services is to standardize the data
and the interfaces of legacy software to make them available
to other services. Other, more complex services, found in the
upper layers, orchestrate these basic ones to implement their
behaviors, up to the very refined policies of MaaS operators.
There are already a plethora of mobility-related data
sources and services. To fulfill our goal of seamless com-
position, SMAll must address the issues of standardization
of data formats and of service invocation interfaces, foresee
the implementation of infrastructural components which
are likely to be needed by most services, and provide
an orchestration framework to streamline the composition
of available services into more complex applications. To
provide all the needed components for MaaS operators,
the SMAll platform (Figure 2) embraces the concept of
microservices for offering:
• wrappers converting legacy data source into SMAll-
Compliant Services (SCS);
• helper services (e.g., authentication, authorization,
scheduling, routing, orchestration);
• The service registry storing the definition of all the
services deployed on the platform;
• business intelligence providing auditing and KPI
metering;
• the actual business logic deployed by operators or in-
termediaries, collecting, storing, and processing data
to offer some data-related insight on the usage of
services.
According to this model, there is no single actor respon-
sible for data quality and service correctness, which poses
serious security issues. However, the platform itself can play
a crucial role in preventing abuses and in monitoring the
correctness of transactions.
3 SECURITY ISSUES
The SMAll platform is an example of cloud architecture,
spanning the standard IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS layers. In partic-
ular, SMAll comprises the SaaS and PaaS layers respectively
because a) it provides services on and for mobility and b) it
supports the deployment of said services.
Indeed, the security issues known for these layers also
apply to SMAll [3]. Hereinafter, we outline the specific
problems that are most relevant for the context of mobility,
followed by discussion of how the adoption of an integrated
platform like SMAll can mitigate them, wherever deemed
possible.
3.1 General cloud security considerations
Literature started to address the main security issues related
to IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS since 2008, with the release of Open-
Nebula, the first true implementation of a Cloud service.
According to [4] an essential list of most important issues
encompasses:
• network security (spoofing, sniffing, DoS);
• data security (locality, integrity, segregation, authen-
ticity, confidentiality, privacy, access control);
• authentication, identity management, sign-on pro-
cess, and authorization;
• web application security;
• virtualization vulnerability;
• availability (high availability, disaster recovery).
SMAll enables the deployment of mobility services in the
cloud. It also provides a set of helper services, orchestrated
by a dispatcher, that take care of routing the invocation of
services and the return of the results. Among the func-
tionalites of helper services are countermeasures against
some of the aforementioned security issues. Authentication
and user profile management helpers act as a single, trusted
interface towards identity providers, for single sign-on, and
personal data vaults [5]. The authorization helper uniformly
applies access control policies, which can be configured and
managed as attributes of the deployed services (for example,
following a MAC model similar to Flask/SELinux’s Type
Enforcement [6]). The invocation of a service through the
SMAll service caller can control the data stream encryp-
tion (taking care of key management issues) to ensure its
confidentiality. The scheduler assigns priorities to queries;
during normal execution, this scheduler has the goal of
making SMAll meet SLAs granted to different services and
customers. In case of DoS attacks the scheduler can mitigate
the saturation of resources.
3.2 Emerging threats
The PaaS layer in SMAll differs from most PaaS solutions
because of its openness and flexibility. SMAll customers
can access available data and services to build and de-
ploy their own services, possibly making them available
to themselves or other customers for the same purpose. A
simple example to clarify this process: a one-stop ticketing
application orchestrates: a) a dynamic planner service that
provides the routing options; b) a user profile manager to
sort them according to preferences; c) a real-time availability
checking/seat reservation service for each operator; d) a set
of gateway services for payment.
Every one of these services is available (and useful) as
a standalone application. Moreover, the dynamic planner is
not a simple service: it is the result of orchestrating a static
planner with real-time information about delays, planned
extraordinary events, and disruptions. The branches of this
tree can be followed through many levels, until raw data is
reached (yielded in a standard form by a wrapper service).
As the enabler, SMAll shall assume responsibility for the
trustworthiness and reliability of the services; this is un-
usual for “classic” PaaS [7]. While it is unrealistic to expect
that SMAll guarantees complete correctness of data sources
and deployed services, especially under the assumption of
being substantially open to any customer, providing at least
a measure of their security is an important (and value-
adding) service. In particular, it is necessary to define in-
dicators for data quality and service behavior, and to devise
a way to compute their values for complex data sources and
services resulting from the aggregation and orchestration of
existing ones [8], [9]. As it is made clear in the following
discussion, these functions are an important component of
a defense strategy against insider threats, which are likely
and dangerous in the studied architecture.
3.3 Data Provenance
One of the most studied issues about data sources security is
data provenance [10], [11]. Ascertaining provenance means
ensuring that the source of data is verifiable, i.e., that it
corresponds to the one declared in the process of creation. In
a MaaS scenario, provenance protection is a defense against
malicious operators claiming to expose data of a competitor,
forging them to gain unfair advantage.
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Fig. 2. SMAll platform architecture
3.4 Data Trustworthiness
Data trustworthiness, intended as the possibility to ascer-
tain the correctness of the information provided by a data
source, is loosely related to provenance [12]. Ideally, but
infrequently, data samples can be independently measured
by different users, thus allowing cross-checking and error
correction. For original data, i.e., provided by its creator, the
trustworthiness score is usually derived from the reputation
of the creator. In this case, it is very difficult to block attacks
in which, for example, the creator advertises a data source of
given quality, but then exposes a degraded version, to keep
the advantage of more precise/timely information for itself.
3.5 Service Maliciousness
The trustworthiness of a service is an easy concept to in-
tuitively grasp, but difficult to formalize and to verify in an
open environment. In the context of SMAll service trustwor-
thiness can be associated with its compliance to a declared
function, and shall be evaluated before the application is
admitted to the platform and, ideally, again at every usage.
If a service creates aggregated data, processing various
sources, it is necessary to ensure that the computation is cor-
rect, that no useful results are hidden (completeness), and
input data is not tampered with (soundness). These are all
likely opportunities for a malicious insider that succeeds in
registering a rogue service. For example, a tampered travel
planner could slightly deflect routes to favor or damage
certain businesses; a modified delay-checking application
could hide or amplify violations of agreed service levels.
3.6 Service vulnerability to external attacks
There are applications that exhibit wrong behaviors not
because of their maliciousness, but because of unexpected
vulnerabilities to maliciously crafted invocations. In this
case, there is an external threat in addition to the twofold
insider threat: one in the loose meaning of an insider being
so careless as to deploy a vulnerable application, the other in
the case that another insider is in the best position to exploit
it. For example, a service with extensive access privileges
to private data could be tricked to leak it to a service
with much more restrictive access rights. Another example,
mixing service vulnerability with data provenance issues, is
that of a service that provides crowd-sourced information
about the status of the road transport network. Failure to
implement an effective fraud-prevention mechanism could
allow an attacker to inject fake reports to influence the
behavior of users.
4 DIRECTIONS IN INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION
Many of the described problems are intrinsic to the concepts
of cloud, SaaS, and data sharing. For this reason, before
being able to develop a solution for data quality and data
provenance, there is a need for a preliminary analysis of all
the metrics of these types of solutions.
4.1 Data Provenance
The first thing that we must consider when dealing with
services that expose or elaborate data is to differentiate
between data and information.
According to [13], information systems provide data in
a certain business context. When data is used by human
beings, it turns into information, and information finally
turns into knowledge by being interpreted and linked for
a given purpose.
As already mentioned, in the context of mobility, verified
information is of paramount importance. SMAll supports
the provision of different sources of data along with their
associated metadata (e.g., used to verify their provenance).
However, SMAll shall also provide techniques, embodied
by helper services, to transform those data into verified
information.
Data Provenance verification is a known problem in
literature. Different approaches can be taken to support a
solution for the problem of recognizing the source of a data
stream. Literature agrees [14] that the requirements for a
provenance management system are:
• Verifiability: a provenance system should be able to
verify a process in terms of the actors (or services)
involved, their actions, and their relationship with
one another.
• Accountability: an actor (or service) should be ac-
countable for its actions in a process. Thus, a prove-
nance system should record in a non-repudiable
manner any provenance generated by a service.
• Reproducibility: a provenance system should be able
to repeat a process and possibly reproduce a process
from the provenance stored.
• Preservation: a provenance system should have the
ability to maintain provenance information for an
extended period of time. This is essential for applica-
tions run in an enterprise system.
• Scalability: given the large amounts of data that
an enterprise system handles, a provenance system
needs to be scalable.
• Generality: a provenance system should be able to
record provenance from a variety of applications.
• Customizability: a provenance system should allow
users to customize it by setting metadata such as
time, events of recording, and the granularity of
provenance.
In a microservice architecture, an application is essen-
tially a collection of workflows. These workflows can com-
pose many levels of services, each processing and modifying
the data before its final destination. What we need is a way
to certify the metadata related to a data stream and manage
its validity during time and re-elaboration [15]. Generally
literature considers 4 different sets of techniques [16]:
• Subject of Provenance, in which provenance can ei-
ther be available explicitly or be deduced indirectly.
• Representation of Provenance, in which the way
provenance is represented follows from a tradeoff
between the cost of recording it and its richness; it
is typically implemented either with annotations or
with inversion [17].
• Provenance Storage in which the design of metadata
is also important to enable scalable storage.
• Provenance Dissemination where, in order to use
provenance, a system should allow rich and diverse
means to access it.
According to works like [18], this problem could be
solved only with a creation of private and public key system
for data stream certification. A good reference is the system
developed in [19], describing a cryptographic provenance
verification approach for ensuring data properties and in-
tegrity for single hosts. Specifically, the authors designed
and implemented an efficient cryptographic protocol that
enforces keystroke integrity. This kind of protocol can be
integrated as a helper service in SMAll. However, public-
key schemes are known for their significant computational
load, thus existing techniques may not be suitable for high-
rate, high-volume data sources. Moreover, there could be
the need for an algorithm for the provenance of composed
data.
In some cases, data originated from the composition
of raw (or otherwise “lower ranked”) sources should be
accompanied by suitable metadata that allows to verify
the provenance of the input values, in a cryptographically
strong way. In the context of SMAll, it could be important
and useful to capture and understand the propagation of
data.
In [20], the authors exploit the propagation of the meta-
data on the various levels to create a general metadata
storage and management layer for parallel file systems, in
which metadata includes both file operations and prove-
nance metadata.
Also Merkle hash trees could be a good candidate to
build proofs for composed data pieces [21]. The combination
of metadata propagation with key distribution propagation
management can guarantee a good level of trust in prove-
nance management systems. Works similar to [22] discuss
how to support provenance awareness in spatial data infras-
tructure and investigates key issues including provenance
modeling, capturing, and sharing that can be easily used to
implement a key propagation system.
4.2 Data Trustworthiness
Rating systems are one possible implementation for trust-
worthiness evaluation mechanisms. Auditing services, inte-
grated in the SMAll platform, attribute scores to the data-
source services based on different criteria. For example,
feedback from users of the data source, or a combination of
reputation scores when the same data can be fed by many
sources and cross-checked. Of course, reputation systems
in turn introduce their fair share of problems [23], [24],
[25], [26]. An alternative or complementary solutions are
anomaly detection services based on machine learning and
pattern recognition [27]. Then, as cited for provenance,
SMAll should automatically compute the trustworthiness
score of data originated from the composition of other
sources, based on their scores.
4.3 Service Maliciousness
In principle, the SMAll service deployment interface can
verify the correctness of an application before accepting it.
In practice, this operation is very hard to perform. One
indicator of correctness is the compliance to a template of
acceptable interfaces for the kind of service the application
provides. However, it is very difficult to define templates
strict enough to allow sensible compliance checks, but gen-
eral enough to avoid hindering the deployment of legitimate
services. Another way to check correctness is to look at the
actual behavior of the application, as it is common in anti-
malware checks, through static analysis, verifying the code
to discover possible malicious behaviors. These techniques
are far from infallible, and their scope falls much shorter
than what is required in our context. Indeed, in this context
a malicious behavior can be a subtle deviation from the
correct calculation [28], which is far more difficult than the
detection of traditional malicious behaviors (e.g., damaging
or self-replicating ones).
A more promising technique is that of dynamic analysis
of malware [29]. A way to discover a malicious behavior of a
service is to implement a mechanism that could guarantee,
in every moment, a reproducibility of the results. Taking
advantage of the data provenance certifications of raw data,
and of its propagation to results, it is possible to implement
a reference monitor to verify the compliance of results to the
expected values. In case of conflicts between the declared
results and the actual ones, SMAll could discover what
has been tampered with: the source data, or theservice
logic. In the first case, this detection can also feed the data
trustworthiness rating system.
4.4 Service vulnerability to external attacks
SMAll could provide input sanitization, or in general, Intru-
sion Prevention System / Intrusion Detection System as a
service, to protect applications from most of the malicious
invocations. Tracing cross-callings between SMAll services
can thwart insider attacks aimed at privilege escalation. This
can be done by taking into account the whole set of access
control rules before allowing unauthorized data to leak in
or out through a careless application.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed security issues in MaaS-
enabling platforms, one of the emerging scenarios made
possible by developments in the field of microservices. The
SMAll platform allows to conduct a specific case study.
SMAll aims to be open to distributed service deployment
from any customer, potentially giving way to insider threat
scenarios, but at the same time it represents an opportunity
to provide centralized security functions. From its architec-
ture, general cloud-related, as well as specific security issues
arise. This paper gives an overview of the most sensible
approaches to mitigation of the illustrated threats.
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